

# NEWSLETTER

Media & Security Sector Reform

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## The Politics of Defense Budgeting in Indonesia

### Preface

The issue of defense budget is, at least, related to five aspects: defense strategic planning, allocation of budget and its resources, management capacity, strategic industry development, also geographic and geo-strategic condition. These five factors are interrelated and able to provide explanation to public regarding the objective of budgeting, the amount of expenses, management capacity, efficiency and accountability, and the rationalization of the budgetary needs.

This far, the problems arising from the weakness of the defense capacity, such as the weak border management, imperfect primary equipment system, limited military operations, up to the lack of decent living condition of the soldiers which are always associated with the limited defense budget. Such perspective might raise public's sympathy, but on the other hand fails to answer the fundamental issues in our defense budget.

We have never carried out the consistency check between the defense strategic planning with the total amount of budget which should be or have been allocated, the claim over the deficit in budget with the efficiency and effectiveness of budget management, the request over the allocation increase with the audit and evaluation result against the budget implementation, as well as the demand for rapid fulfillment, and oversight and legal action for misconduct; all are carried out transparently and accountably.

Furthermore, we also found the claim over budgetary fulfillment through the mechanism of off-budget from business sector and regional budget. It has never been checked on how far the truth of such claim went as there is the latter fact about the military entering the business sector, and this practice threatens their professionalism as the security actor, enable them to take side in favoring the interest of the business and local government, thus become the threat to public. Moreover, they might become the instrument of repression which causes the excess of violations against law and human rights.

At the end, everything seems to be a matter of numbers and figures; the small one, the less one and the needs to be increased in the budget. In fact, the problem heavily links to the field of strategic defense planning, where the budget is not spent merely for the aimless institutional regular expenses and clear macro-design of defense.

The problem is also related to the non-functioning budget management, unclear priorities, and high dependence to the foreign products of primary equipment. On the peak of the problems lies the issue of the lack of seriousness of the state to reform the defense sector comprehensively.

# Increased Budget and More Accountable

The accidents of the military airplanes in Indonesia during the four years time have been fantastic. Since 2005, there were at least 13 cases of accident, from sliding down the runway to heavy fire. It implies that there are approximately 3 times of accidents in one year. Certainly it is no good news to the image of our defense posture. Particularly in the heated tension between Indonesia and Malaysia regarding the taking over of sea border line in the Ambalat block, which forced the two countries to meet in order to prevent the situation from deteriorating.

In the case of the military airplanes accident, unfortunately not all ended well like Captain (Pilot) H.M. Kisha. The pilot of the fighting jet Hawk-200 number TT 0203 managed to escape when the jet-plane slide shortly before taking off in the runway of the Sultan Syarif Kasim II Airport in Pekanbaru Riau on the 30 October 2007.

Or in the example of Major (Pilot) Muhammad Dadang when the Hawk-209 he manned underwent a heavy accident over the Airport of Sultan Syarif Kasim II in Pekanbaru Riau, on 21 November 2006. He managed to escape through the ejection seat when the engine of the British Aerospace-made aircraft suddenly went off. He survived, while the jet-plane he manned alone slide all the way before finally rolled over outside the runway.

In most cases, the accidents had caused some loss: from wounded to taking lives. When the Indonesia Air Force's Hercules C-130 crashed in the rice field areas of Geplak Village, Karas-Magetan, East Java on the 20 May 2009, there were a high number of casualties: more than 100 persons, most of the were the TNI personnel. Only during the year 2009 there have been at least 76 members of TNI lost their lives in the military airplane accidents.

Accidents after accidents however have drawn debate over the defense budget, which according to the perspective of the Armed Forces is far from

sufficient. TNI, as stated by the Commander in Chief of TNI, Gen. Joko Santoso, viewed that there were no correlations between the limited budgets to the plane's airworthiness. According to him, airworthiness is all about its preparedness. "Despite being new, Sukhoi plane must also be set up. New planes are unfortunately not always airworthy. They must all be put in order", according to Joko Santoso after meeting the President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, on the last 15 June 2009.

Next to the subsequent plane accidents, the heightened tension between Indonesia-Malaysia due to the unauthorized breach on Indonesia's territory also made the Parliament responding to such situation. In the 16 June 2009 meeting the Parliament agreed to increase the budget of the Department of Defense to 36.5 trillion Rupiah in 2010 from the previous budget which was 33.7 trillion Rupiah. "All factions agreed to increase the defense budget", stated the member of Budget Committee at the Parliament, Abdullah Azwar.

The budget increase for the Department of Defense, according to Azawar Anas, was certainly aimed at improving the quality of defense's primary equipment. Though it remains relatively far from the intention of the Department of Defense's budget request of 100 trillion Rupiah, half of the budget for education amounting 20 percent from total national budget of 100 trillion Rupiah, Anas considers the increase as significant. This approval, however, is not without a note; he added. Parliament asked the Department of Defense to reform the defense acquisition and procurement of goods and equipment which has been through the mechanism of partnership.

Defense acquisition, including the military equipment, has been the object of middlemanship. This theme had once driven the Parliamentarians infuriated with the statement from the Ministed of Defense in one occasion in Jakarta, in October 2007.

“I do not intend to make the budget of the Department of Defense as the object of the middlemen; from the third party or middleman, who at the same time are the respective Parliamentarians”.

The infuriated Parliamentarians held an internal meeting in responding to this accusation. “We are prone to be blamed for middlemanship”, said Happy Bone, member of the Parliament Commission I from Golkar Faction, in an internal meeting in October 2007. “We need to clarify in order to sustain the commission’s integrity”. That same afternoon, the representatives of Commission I had a meeting with the Minister. It ended the debate in a letdown: Juwono denied calling the members of the Parliament as middlemen.

It is also widely admitted that there is a possibility for the representative of people’s to involve in the budgeting business, though it cannot be neglected that the same actor with the same motive could as well be found in the Department of Defense. Happy Bone is not totally rejecting this suspicion, as in the Indonesian proverb “when there is sugar, there are ants”. But he added that all efforts lay in the hand of the Department of Defense. “It is like a cooking pot’s lid; the Department of Defense needs to make it out of steel, if necessary, so that it is middlemen-proof”.

Regarding the defense acquisition, the idea of “fertile land” is widely shared. The coordinator of the political corruption division at the Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), Fahmi Badoh, criticized the settlement over the accusation of middlemanship and called it a letdown. “It was a compromising end”, he added. The middlemen-scandal could have been brought to an end, not only in the Parliament, but also in the Department of Defense.

The government has given positive sign to add the budget. It was also confirmed by the Ministry of Finance that they are ready to increase the budget amount, but under one condition: that it can be implemented in one budgetary year. The Minister of Finance Sri Mulyani Indrawati, after a working meeting with the Budget Committee of the Parliament on 17 June 2009 confirmed the support for defense budget increase. Even if the addition would be as high as 5 trillion or 10 trillion as long as it does not cause imbalance in the budget efficiency.

“I know the detailed record, since 2002 the defense budget has been difficult to implement. When

it is planned in budget, automatically it will highly overwhelm the deficit finance”, she added. Therefore, what can be done by the government is to prepare a budgeting mechanism by allocating a long term source for funding. Through this mechanism, TNI could take out its budget needs when they are ready for implementation, so there will not be any obstacles if the procurement plans changes.

However, the increase of defense budget is not without critical responses. According to the Executive Director of Institute for Defense, Security and Peace Studies (IDSPS) Mufti Makaanim, very often that the budget increase is not based on the solid and systematic argument. Determining the amount of budget should be based on the gravity of threats to deal with, while at the same time the national financial situation should be taken into account as well. Ideally, planning a national budget must consider such aspects.

The economist from CIDES, Umar Juoro during the discussion of “Defense Budget and the Sovereignty of Indonesia”, 9 July 2009, viewed that it is not entirely proper if the defense budget is increased up to 10 trillion Rupiah given that the overall economic situation is not currently stable, due to the global financial crisis. “I agree with budget increase, but ranging from 5 to 7 trillion Rupiah”. With the 6 percent economic growth, the increase to 10 trillion Rupiah is seen as unrealistic.

Umar Juoro also reminded that from the perspective of budget balance, the current budget is actually sufficient, but it has not been utilized optimally. “It is sufficient because it is the second highest in the national budget (after education)”, he said. It looked insufficient because the routine operational budget and salaries are already included. “There should be an increase, at least 5 to 7 trillion Rupiah in the coming year”.

The researcher from the Indonesia Institute of Science, Jaleswari Pramodawardani, in the same occasion also stated that the portion of the budget used for real defense needs, next to regular expenses and well-being of soldiers is only 12,8 trillion Rupiah out of 33.6 trillion Rupiah. She, on one hand agrees with the budget increase; but it has to be accompanied with clean and good management. “It should be allocated properly and transparently. Learning from the 2006 experience, there was an estimation of 36 percent leakage in the Department of Defense’s budget. Do not let that happen again,” she added.

In addition to that, the overall trend of the Department of Defense's budget, according to Jane's Procurement, increases on a yearly basis.

#### Indonesia's Defense Procurement\*

Year	Total Defense Expenditure (trillion rupiah)	% to GDP	Procurement (trillion rupiah)	Personnel (trillion rupiah)	Operational & Maintenance (trillion rupiah)
2001	14,3	0,7	-	n/a	n/a
2002	12,754	0,7	2,213	6,818	0,642
2003	9,709	0,48	1,99	7,675	0,043
2004	11,814	0,51	2,91	8,834	0,070
2005	23,441	0,84	8,881	10,305	4,253
2006	28,2	0,84	10,451	12,108	5,640
2007	32,64	0,82	11,824	14,287	6,528
2008	30,6	0,68	10,71	13,77	6,120
2009	35	0,69	10,5	17,5	7,000
2010	39,605	0,7	11,089	20,594	7,921
2011	44,068	0,7	11,017	22,915	8,813

Source: Jane's, Indonesia Defense Budget, from "One Decade of Military Reform (Indonesian translation: Satu Dekade Reformasi Militer), edited by Alexandra R. Wulan, published by FES and Pacivis, November 2008

In the issue of defense budget one of the biggest problems is the accountability, Mufti added. "The Department of Defense brought up the issue of budget increase, but public do not have access to the report of the previous budget". This condition makes the public uncertain with the military arguments to raise the budget, while at the same time draws suspicions. He argued that the lack of accountability is due to the TNI categorizing defense budget and implementation as state secrets which are exempted from public access.

This policy is not entirely new. It was the same response as shown by the Department of Defense during the working meeting with the Commission I of the Parliament during the discussion of the State Secrecy Bill, last 4 May 2009. During the discussion, they were arguing over the article 6 which regulates what can be categorized as secret. The article covers the scope of state secrets into 5 categories: state secrets on national defense; the plan, organization, and function of the TNI's mobilization; intelligence, international affairs, and the national economic security.

The meeting was stalled for some time and did not move to other topic for approximately 3 hours because the Department of Defense wanted to categorize the soldier's salary as state secret and restricted from public access. This immediately triggered strong reaction from the Parliamentarians. As Zis Muzahid, member of the Defense Committee claimed, the government's proposal simply contradicts with the Law No. 14/2008 on the Openness of Public Information Law. "This is

too much", he said.

When a series of accident occurred recently, the Chairman of the Parliament, Agus Laksono asked TNI to open up and cooperate for auditing with regard to the recent series of primary equipment accidents. "The defense equipments are of high concern. It is an out of the ordinary affairs. Plane crashed repeatedly," he demanded. What did TNI have to reply? "What else needs for audit? All are carried out regularly", answered the Head of the Information Center from the TNI Headquarter, Air Vice Marshall Sagoem Tambun.

Mufti Makaarim argued, the aspiration to seek for military accountability does not lie solely in the hand of the government, but also in the Parliament that grants approval to the proposed budget. However, he senses that the government and Parliamentarians are reluctant in carrying out the substantial function. "There is an assumption that the military serves as the third political power after the government and Parliament, so that it has to be treated carefully".

The closed and therefore, the assumed rejection over accountability finally cause various speculations. "It actually undermines the image of TNI", he added. Without a proper confirmation to public, it is difficult to believe that TNI has committed to transform and reform internally in order to cope with a more democratic political system. This situation, he added, can also be understood as the President's lack of political will in pushing forward with the military professionalism and accountability. [AM]

# Capacity Building of the Indonesian Armed Forces or Other Factors

**D**uring the 2009, at least there have been six accidents of primary equipment from various branches. The situation has forced the government to determine the proper and progressive steps to stop the unfortunate accidents that have taken the lives of civilians and military personels. The widely circulated opinion as argued by the government through the Department of Defense is through increasing the military budget which has not met the current ideal needs.

There seems to be a wide agreement from public as it may offer logical solution to the problem. When the government is trying to improve the capacity and performance of the defense equipment, financial support follows accordingly. Even the Parliament has also committed to approve the budget increase for the next term in the amount of 7-10 trillion Rupiah from the current 33,6 trillion Rupiah.

However, the civil society organizations working in security sector reform hold different perspective about such situation. The limited amount of budget is not the only cause of the series of accidents. There are some other factors playing, even more fundamental to this, yet they seem to be ignored.

As an example, when budget is the main issue, then the government's solution to increase the number of defense acquisition and procurement did not necessarily receive negative response from the Parliament. After the Ambalat incident 5 years ago, for instance the Parliament has agreed to government's request for more procurement. Since then procurement from domestic and abroad has increased. But in reality, accidents keep taking place.

In addition to that, from the aspect of financing, in order to meet the defense requirement of TNI, government—without essential response from the Parliament—had given privileges and special treatment within which might contain prospects for wrongdoing, procedure-wise. For example: Minister of Defense proposed once that the government passed the regulation for domestic loan for procurement which was outside the scheme of national budget.

Therefore the CSOs are suggesting to the policy-maker to formulate the scale of priorities in developing the capabilities of defense and the scheme for defense financing, whose importance are often left out by the

policy-maker.

Not only that, the CSOs are also strongly demanding the restructurization of the territorial command system which takes most portion of the military budget. CSOs are still focusing in transparency and accountability, as these important aspects are yet to take place, in the midth of rapid return to secrecy regime.

Various problems as mentioned above, particularly in the absence of the priority scale in defense planning and territorial command system make the TNI loses its capacity and capability as an institution mandated to safeguard the integrity of the country, in professionally facing the threat potentials towards it.

In the Defense White Paper Indonesia 2008, there are some identified patterns of threat against the defense and security of Indonesia which fall within the responsibility of TNI: terrorism, armed separatist conflicts, communal conflicts, transnational crime, air and sea-based threats, illegal migration, environmental degradation, and natural disaster.

According to the Department of Defense those threats remain relevant, whereby some might have more variations. Therefore it is logical that the demands for systematic efforts in improving the TNI's capabilities become central. It is within this context that the widely-discussed discourse is the need for sufficient weaponry system.

However, the debates on the improvement of the TNI's capabilities through new procurement are always confronted by a question: where will the source of funding come from? The TNI Law has stated that TNI is financed by the national budget. But what is also widely known to public is there has been another source of off budget whose amount is still subject to questions.

The source of off-budget as explained by Dylan Hendricson and Nicole Ball (2002) covers two categories of military budget that are not inline with the basic principle of governance: first, the military budget that is hidden in the non-defense budget and not incorporated in the defense budget. Second, expenses that are not included in the budget at all and being financed by formal economic means or criminal activities. Nicole Ball also calls it as extra-budget.

These experts categorized 10 sources of the extra-

budgetary defense budgeting:

1. Parastatals: non-military revenues including from the business which are used for military service.
2. Military business: involvement in the non-military business
3. Creation of funds: special funds which are intended for civilian purpose, but used for military needs instead.
4. Barter trade: agricultural commodities traded for military equipment
5. Direct financing through natural resources: involving the structure of military/state structure, including exploitations of diamonds, gems, timber, fishing, and oil.
6. War levies: the security levies taken from the people or business institutions which are not incorporated in the budget.
7. Foreign aid: military equipment which are granted and not included on the national budget, as well as the multinational companies which are paying for the state security personels.

8. Donor aid for the program of military demobilization and reintegration.
9. Informal/criminal means; including fuel smuggling, gambling, drugs trafficking, human and arms trafficking, illegal logging, kidnapping, forgery, prostitution, money laundering, hijacking.
10. Under-valuation of economic resources: the use of low-paid workers to build the military infrastructure.

The CSOs also highlight the loophole to the policymaker that because TNI can no longer depend on the national budget, it does not automatically allow the TNI to extort funds from illegal sources in meeting their needs. It will trigger the danger of rising military conservatism in politics, social, and economics.

On the other hand, the government and Parliament must uphold the effective civilian control over the military budget by providing a new budgeting mechanism according to the principle of national budget, authorizing the check and balance mechanism for budget management in order to ensure the principle of accountability and transparency. [MBD & HD]

JOINT PRESS RELEASE  
 MAINTENANCE OF THE OLD DEFENSE PRIMARY EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE TERMINATED  
 (The Government Failed to Improve the Defense Capacity and Wellbeing of Soldiers)

The Network of Civil Society for Security Sector Reform is expressing deep condolences and concern for the civilian and military losses during the accident of Hercules C-130 No. A-1325 crash in Geplak Village, Karas, Magetan-East Java on the 20 May 2009.

The Network of Civil Society for Security Sector Reform is deeply concerned with the more frequent accidents to various branches of TNI. The number of loss of lives and wounded soldiers in the equipment accidents are increasing from time to time. In 2009 (up to May) there have been 76 soldiers lost their lives. How many more will experience the same fate? Such situation urged the government to find progressive breakthrough to bring this unfortunate condition to an end.

The Network of Civil Society for Security Sector Reform also regretted the response from various parties holding the view that such frequent accidents occurred solely because of the low budget of defense provided by the government. The insufficient budget is actually only one of several factors behind the series of accidents suffered by TNI. The other important factors are the formulation the scale of priorities in developing the capabilities of defense and the scheme for defense financing, whose importance are often left out by the policymaker. The importance of the restructurization of the territorial command system which takes most portion of the military budget, instead of allocated for equipment acquisition and maintenance as well as the soldiers' wellbeing should be seriously considered by the coming government post 2009 election.

The Network of Civil Society for Security Sector Reform perceives that in the longer run the government should start giving significant attention to research and development in defense technology. The improvement and development of the domestic strategic industry aiming at building national resilience in defense technology should become priority in the comprehensive national development plan.

Therefore the political commitment of the government and Parliament in policy formulation, decision making, and budget allocation is the most important factor in determining the success of defense capacity improvement. The absence of sufficient fund in the national budget is not the reason to neglect the budgeting for defense improvement. Because all this time, the government has been able to allocate funds for paying the loan up to 200 trillion, to increase its capital to the international financial institutions such as Asian Development Bank and World Bank, even to provide fiscal stimulus for business sector. The problem lies in the determination of the scale of priority in the national budget with proper distribution among the three branches of TNI.

The political commitment of the government to provide economic solutions to defense industry which has always been in the monopsony market (state as the main buyer) becomes one of the indicators from the government commitment in safeguarding and defending the country. In the short term the government needs to immediately conduct comprehensive audit in the capacity of Indonesia's defense, in order to further reduce the old weapons and weapons' diversifications which currently are too many and becoming the burden of maintenance expenses. In addition to that, the Network also urges the Parliament, particularly the Commission I to carry out relevant oversight for the process of defense acquisition, so that it can be guaranteed that the transparency and accuracy in determining the scale of priority in the limited defense budget could be optimized.

Jakarta, 27 May 2009  
 The Network of Civil Society for Security Sector Reform  
 KONTRAS, IDSPS, PRAXIS, PROPATRIA, FEDERASI KONTRAS, INFID, ELSAM, LESSPERSI.

# Defense Budgeting: International Normative Norms and Implementation in Indonesia

One of the fundamental problems in building the democratic and professional defense system is the issue of transparency and oversight to the defense budget, particularly from the Parliament. Some reasons are behind this argument. First, defense budget originates from the citizen's tax or the taxpayers money. Second, budgetary oversight is one form of the public's participation in the defense policy-making process. Third, the transparency and budgetary oversight is the form of checks and balances system in the democratic governance.

Regarding the issue of budget transparency and oversight, this section is divided into two parts. First part will elaborate the normative principles in the level of global and regional concerning defense budget transparency and oversight. The second part will elaborate the issue of transparency and oversight in defense budget in Indonesia.

## International Norms

International norms on transparency and oversight in defense budget can be found in the global and regional level. In the global level, the common norms are:

- On the 12 December 1980 the UN General Assembly passed the Resolution no. 35/142 B on the member state's obligation to report their annual defense procurement to the UN Secretary General.
- Principles of Good Budgeting by the World Bank that consist of comprehensiveness, predictability, contestability, transparency, dan periodically.
- Similar thing is done by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by compiling Code of Good Practice on Fiscal Transparency that consist of clarity of roles and responsibilities, public availability, open budget preparation, execution and reporting, and independent assurances of integrity.

While in the regional level, the normative principles are:

- OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects Military. The article 22 stated that "Each participating State will provide for its legislative approval of defence expenditures. Each participating State will, with due regard to national security requirements, exercise restraint in its military expenditures and provide for transparency and public access to information related to the armed forces".
- NATO Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB). In the agreement the member states of NATO

agreed to develop transparency in the field of defense. Indonesia: Several Issues amidst the Problem of Transparency and Oversight of the Defense Budget

The article 25 of the Law No. 3/2002 stipulated that the defense budget comes from the national budget and is utilized to build, maintain, improve, and make use of TNI and the other defense components. It means that defense budget originates from public, through tax. Accordingly, the public holds the right to know and monitor the budget, particularly through the representatives in the Parliament.

In implementing the oversight function to the defense budget, not only the Parliament has the rights to be involved in the formulation of defense budget, they also have the rights to oversee the management of the defense budget.

Unfortunately, the oversight function is yet to be implemented optimally, because the Parliament, especially Commission I, only exercises oversight function in the planning phase. While the oversight in the management and implementation is yet to be carried out.

The other issue is regarding the Law No. 14/2008 about the Public Information Openness which regulates that every individual has the right to obtain public information (article 4) and that it is mandatory to all public institutions to grant access for public information to anyone who requested it, as long as it is not the exempted information (article 17). Furthermore this article 17 has endorsed that the defense budget is not the exempted information. But on the contrary, the State Secrecy Bill is trying to seal off the access to public information, particularly those that are related to defense budgeting, by stating that "information that are related to budget allocation and procurement, and the appropriate government asset for national security" as part of the state secrecy. This claim is principally against the demand for transparency and public oversight of the defense budget. If the bill is passed, then the state secrets will definitely block the access of public in overseeing; starting from the planning to the implementation of the defense budgeting.

Through the abovementioned elaboration it can be concluded that the issue of defense budgeting in Indonesia is not fully implemented according to the international standards and norms, even to the contrary, it is challenged by the state secrecy bill which is shutting the public's access to public information. This challenge is a strong sign to public in order to urge more pressure and to oversee the government in managing the defense budget transparently. [WAP]



Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Indonesia Office was established in 1968, and particularly since 1998 FES has been working in various activities to support the democratization and socio-economic development in Indonesia. The area of work of FES covers political education, conflict prevention and resolutions, security sector reform, free and fair media, strengthening trade union, and gender mainstreaming.

These objectives are sought through cooperation with Indonesian institutions, namely the civil society organizations and other corresponding organizations. The activities of FES and its partner organizations cover seminar, workshop, discussion, training, as well as producing publications. FES Indonesia also works for strengthening the international dialogue by facilitating exchanges of delegations, experts, academicians, and senior journalists in various regional and international forums.

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**ALIANSI  
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INDEPENDEN**

*Aliansi Jurnalis Independen* or the Alliance of Independent Journalists is an organization representing professional journalists in Indonesia. In the national level, AJI is represented by AJI Indonesia, whereby the city-level AJI represents members of AJI in 26 cities in Indonesia.

AJI has strong concern for the issue of free press and freedom of expression in Indonesia. *Aliansi Jurnalis Independen* or the Alliance of Independent Journalists is committed to uphold the public rights for information and free press. For the first goal AJI views itself as part of public who fights for public access to public information. AJI is committed to uphold the public rights for public and free press. For the first goal AJI views itself as part of public who fights for public access to public information.

On its role as the press and journalists organization, AJI is also committed to the establishment of free press. The goal of this commitment is to fulfill public needs on objective and balanced information. To maintain the freedom of press, AJI strives to create a beneficial press culture: as achieved by professional journalism, strong work ethic, and on the same time, the journalists' welfare. These three factors are intertwined. Strong professionalism and compliance to work ethics cannot be achieved without proper fulfillment of living needs. AJI argues that decency of living has impact on jour-

nalists commitment to work professionally, complying the work ethics, and be independent.

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Institute for Defense, Security and Peace Studies (IDSPPS) was established in the mid-2006 by activists and academicians who share strong concerns for the advocacy of the security sector reform in strengthening democratic transitions in post-1998 Indonesia. IDSPPS works together with civil groups and society dedicated to a democratic and accountable governance, as well as strong involvement of the civil society in the security sector policy making.

IDSPPS carries out policy research in the fields of defense and security, conflict resolutions and human rights; establishes dialogue with various stakeholders: civil society, the security sector, parliamentarians, and other corresponding institutions. These activities aim to push for policy acceleration in the security sector, strengthen the involvement of civil society organizations, and encourage peaceful resolutions for violent conflict and human rights violations.

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